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LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
 To the best of Respondent State of Utah’s knowledge, all 
interested parties appear in the caption of this Brief.  The Utah Board of 
Pardons and Parole and the Utah Office of Debt Collection are entities 
of the State of Utah. 
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 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 
 This Court has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Utah 
Court of Appeals.  Utah Code § 78A-3-102(3)(a). 
  STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON CERTIORARI 
The Court granted a writ of certiorari limited to the following 
issue:  “Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the district 
court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate 
Petitioner’s motion to set aside the Board of Pardons and Parole’s 
restitution order.” 
Preservation and Standard of Review:  Garcia preserved this issue 
before the district court and the court of appeals.  The district court’s 
final order was based on its holding that it was without jurisdiction to 
review the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole’s (Board) restitution 
order.  State v. Garcia, 2016 UT App 96, ¶¶ 1, 7, 374 P.3d 1039.  The 
court of appeals affirmed that decision.  Id. ¶¶ 1, 19-20.  On certiorari, 
this Court gives no deference to the court of appeals’ decision and 
reviews its decision under a correctness standard.  Nichols v. Jacobsen 
Constr. Co., Inc., 2016 UT 19, ¶ 13, 374 P.3d 3.   
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The controlling provisions are: 
Utah Code § 77-27-5(3): 
Decisions of the board in cases involving paroles, 
pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, 
restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are final and 
are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section 
prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment, 
including restitution as provided in Section 77-27-6. 
Utah Code § 77-27-6(4): 
  If the defendant, upon termination or expiration of the 
sentence owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other 
assessed costs, or if the board makes an order of restitution 
within 60 days after the termination or expiration of the 
defendant's sentence, the matter shall be referred to the 
district court for civil collection remedies. The Board of 
Pardons and Parole shall forward a restitution order to the 
sentencing court to be entered on the judgment docket. The 
entry shall constitute a lien and is subject to the same rules 
as a judgment for money in a civil judgment. 
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
  Dennis Garcia was convicted of automobile homicide.  State v. 
Garcia, 2016 UT App 96, ¶ 1, 374 P.3d 1039.  His presentence 
investigation report stated that the Utah Office of Crime Victim 
Reparations reported paying $7,000 toward the victim’s funeral 
expenses.  Id. ¶ 3.  Garcia served a five-year sentence for his homicide 
3 
 
crime and was released from prison in April 2013.  Id. ¶ 4.  Months 
later, Utah’s Board of Pardons and Parole issued an order of restitution 
requiring Garcia to pay $7,000 to the Office of Victims of Crime.  Id. ¶ 5. 
 The Board sent its order to the district court where it “was duly entered 
into the docket by the trial court.”  Id. ¶ 5. 
 Garcia—contending that the Board’s order was untimely and 
should be vacated—challenged the Board’s order by filing with the 
sentencing court an original motion and a later three motions including 
one under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b).  R. 120-22, 545; Pet. Br. 
33-34.  The sentencing court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider 
Garcia’s attack upon the Board’s order.  Garcia, 2016 UT App 96, ¶ 7.  
Garcia appealed. 
 The court of appeals affirmed.  It agreed that the sentencing court 
lacked jurisdiction to hear Garcia’s motions.  Id. ¶¶ 10-20.  Interpreting 
Utah Code section 77-27-6(4), the court concluded that the Board had 
authority to make restitution orders, the sentencing court had to enter 
the Board’s restitution orders on the court’s judgment docket, and the 
district court had jurisdiction to “administer any collection processes 
stemming from such orders.”  Id. ¶ 14.  But the statute did not revive 
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jurisdiction in the sentencing court to address a challenge to the validity 
of the Board’s restitution order.  Id. ¶ 19.  Lacking jurisdiction, the court 
did not address Garcia’s arguments on the merits.  Id. ¶ 20. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
  The question in this case is not whether Garcia may challenge the 
Board’s restitution order, but how he may challenge it.  The court of 
appeals correctly held that Garcia’s attempt to challenge the restitution 
order in the sentencing court was improper because that court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider motions, including Rule 60(b) motions, attacking 
the Board’s restitution orders.  By statute, the Board’s restitution 
decisions are not subject to judicial review.  So Garcia could not attack 
the Board’s restitution decision by using Rule 60(b) or any other 
ordinary appellate method.   
 But that does not mean that Garcia has no mechanism to 
challenge the Board’s order.  Nothing precludes him from filing a 
petition for extraordinary relief under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B, 
which provides a way to seek equitable relief “where the Board of 
Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to perform an 
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act required by constitutional or statutory law.”  Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B(d)(2)(D). 
 ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals Correctly Held That Garcia 
Cannot Challenge The Board’s Restitution Order With 
Motions, Including A Rule 60(b) Motion. 
 The court of appeals held that Garcia’s sentencing court lacks 
jurisdiction over Garcia’s challenge to the Board’s restitution order.  
State v. Garcia, 2016 UT App 96, ¶ 20, 374 P.3d 1039.  Based on a plain 
language reading of section 6(4), the court concluded that the district 
court had jurisdiction only to “order such civil remedies to assist the 
claimant in collecting on the judgment, [but] nothing in the statute 
confers jurisdiction on the district court to rule upon challenges to the 
fact, amount, or validity of the judgment itself.”  Id. ¶ 17.  Garcia does 
not appear to challenge the court of appeals’ construction of the 
statutory text.  Instead, he focuses his jurisdictional arguments on 
certain cases that he believes contradict the court of appeals’ holding or 
do not support the court.1  But none of Garcia’s arguments undermine 
the court of appeals’ holding. 
                                                 
1  Garcia asserts some arguments that go to the merits of his claims 
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 As a threshold matter, Utah law expressly states that the Board’s 
restitution decisions are “final and are not subject to judicial review.”  
Utah Code § 77-27-5(3).  This Court held that this statute precludes all 
appeals and other remedies at law seeking to challenge the Board’s 
decisions.  Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991) 
(no remedy at law exists from the Board’s decisions but habeas corpus 
review is available).  But the statute does not preclude the review of 
such orders by extraordinary writ.  See id.; see also Padilla v. Utah Bd. 
of Pardons, 947 P.2d 664, 671 (Utah 1997) (the Board’s orders cannot be 
appealed but can be reviewed by way of extraordinary writ); Preece v. 
House, 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah 1994) (“This statute does not preclude 
judicial review of such decisions by way of extraordinary writ.”). 
 Garcia, however, did not file a petition for extraordinary relief 
under Rule 65B.  Instead he filed motions, including a motion under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), in his criminal action seeking 
judicial review of the Board’s order.   Pet. Br. 34.  None of those motions 
                                                                                                                                                             
challenging the validity of the Board’s restitution order.  But those 
arguments are not encompassed within the issue upon which the Court 
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sought an equitable remedy under Rule 65B.  Thus Garcia failed to avail 
himself of the equitable remedy that does exist and instead sought a 
remedy at law that this Court has repeatedly held does not exist against 
the Board’s decisions.  The court of appeals did not err when it affirmed 
the dismissal of Garcia’s attempts to obtain a remedy at law based on 
his challenges to the Board’s restitution decision. 
 Nor can a Rule 60(b) motion be used in challenging an 
administrative decision.  While Utah courts have previously used court 
rules in reviewing administrative actions, this Court has since rejected 
that practice.  Utah’s court rules are no longer applied to proceedings 
before administrative agencies such as those before the Utah Board of 
Pardons and Parole.   
 This Court has held that the “scope of our rules is limited by the 
scope of the authority granted to this court by the Utah Constitution.  
Thus, we can apply these rules only to ‘the courts of the state.’ We are 
powerless to impose our court rules on proceedings outside of state and 
local courts.”  Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 2009 UT 71, ¶ 17, 222 
                                                                                                                                                             
granted review and will not be addressed by the State. 
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P.3d 55 (holding that Rule 60 did not apply to administrative 
proceedings unless the governing statute or regulations so provided).   
 Rule 60(b) does not apply to the decisions of the Board.  Rather, 
Rule 60(b) provides a trial court the opportunity to review its own 
decisions and correct any errors or flaws that it might find.  That is not 
how Garcia tried to use Rule 60(b); he asked the sentencing court to 
review the Board’s decision under Rule 60(b).  That is not the purpose of 
the rule.   
 If the Board erred in making its restitution order, Garcia can seek 
judicial review of the Board’s decision through Rule 65B.  But Rule 60(b) 
does not authorize district courts to entertain challenges to 
administrative decisions.  The court of appeals correctly followed Frito-
Lay in reaching that conclusion.  Garcia, 2016 UT App 96, ¶ 18 n.4 
(“Rule 60(b) provides an avenue for a party to ask the court to review 
and reconsider its own decisions; it does not allow the court to review 
and modify decisions made by an administrative body such as the 
Board.”).  
 
9 
 
 The case law cited by Garcia does not lead to a different result.  He 
relies on State v. Laycock, but Laycock did not involve a legal appeal or a 
Rule 60(b) motion—it involved a petition for extraordinary relief under 
Rule 65B(d)(2).  2009 UT 53, ¶ 7, 214 P.3d 104 (State of Utah used a 
Rule 65B extraordinary writ to challenge a restitution order that the 
State could not appeal).  Far from supporting Garcia’s arguments, 
Laycock shows how Garcia could have properly used an extraordinary 
writ here. 
 Nor does State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 297, 56 P.3d 974, support 
Garcia.  Schultz invalidated a Board restitution order because it was 
issued after parole was terminated.  See id. ¶ 19.  While the court of 
appeals reached the merits of a Board restitution order in Schultz, it did 
so in ruling on a challenge to the validity of a continuing writ of 
garnishment based on a restitution order.  Id. ¶ 1.    
 More important, Schultz does not address the issue here:  whether 
the sentencing court has jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a Board 
restitution order.  Because that issue was not raised, let alone ruled 
upon, in Schultz, that decision does not resolve the issue here. 
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    And the court of appeals properly relied upon State v. Montoya, 
825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (criminal court loses subject 
matter jurisdiction once it imposes a valid sentence) in holding that the 
sentencing court lacked jurisdiction over a challenge to the Board’s 
restitution order.  Garcia, 2016 UT App 96 at ¶ 11.  Contrary to Garcia’s 
suggestion, Montoya has not been (even implicitly) overruled; the court 
of appeals continues to follow Montoya on this point of law.  See, e.g., 
State v. Vaughn, 2011 UT App 411, ¶¶ 11-12, 266 P.3d 202 (following 
Montoya in holding that a criminal court loses subject matter 
jurisdiction upon imposition of a valid sentence); State v. Thorkelson, 
2004 UT App 9, ¶¶ 10, 17, 84 P.3d 854 (same). 
 Laycock did not somehow overrule Montoya.  Laycock does not 
discuss a criminal court’s post-sentencing jurisdiction.  It acknowledges 
only that a party may appropriately file a petition for an extraordinary 
writ to challenge a decision where the party does not have the right to 
appeal.  Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ¶ 7.   
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court should affirm the court of 
appeals’ decision.   
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